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ARGUMENT 
1. Pop-up Advertisements Fit Within the Definition of the Act and Should 
Be Included Therein. 
The statute underlying this action was, at the time this suit was originally filed, a new 
and unexamined statute. The statute was an attempt by the state legislature to relieve Utahns 
from the burdens caused by unsolicited commercial emails. Although Appellants recognize 
the statute has been repealed in response to the passing of a new federal statute dealing with 
this pernicious problem at a Federal level, the Utah statute had not been repealed at the time 
the Appellant was SPAMMED, nor had it been repealed at the time he filed his original 
complaint, nor had it been repealed on the date he gave notice of his intent to appeal the 
district court's decision. This action was and is an attempt by a Utah citizen to enforce 
rights that had been statutorily provided him at the time he filed his action. It was important 
to him then and remains important to him now. 
Appellee insinuates several times in its brief that because the statute has since been 
repealed that there ought not be time or effort wasted on a proper determination of 
Appellant's claim. That however is improper. The rights Appellant had at the time he 
received the email are the same rights that should be considered at this point. SPAM 
remains such a problem that Federal legislation has now been adopted to try and deal with 
this scourge. Further, the decision of this case is important for the Appellant. Any 
suggestions to the contrary are without merit and an attempt to distract the Court. 
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Furthermore, in an apparent attempt to vilify the Plaintiff and his attorneys, they 
include as a footnote the untrue assertion that Plaintiffs counsel has filed more than 1200 
similar cases. This number has been loosely thrown around by Appellee's counsel 
throughout this litigation. It seems difficult to reconcile the assertion on the one hand that 
this is just one simple meaningless case and on the other that there are some "1200" cases 
in the wings. In reality there other cases that have been filed, although the number nowhere 
approaches that suggested by Appellees in this case. In turn, each of those cases will be 
affected by the decision of the Court in this case. Therefore this case does not decide a moot 
point as suggested by Appellants. 
Pop-up advertisements, like the message in this suit, are of the type of "email" 
covered by the statute. The definition section in Utah's Anti Spam statute provides that pop-
up advertisements are indeed covered by the Act and their inclusion in the statute was 
contemplated by the legislature. 
Utah Code §13-36-102(3), defines email as " . . . an electronic message, file, data, or 
other information that is transmitted: (a) between two or more computers, computer 
networks, or electronic terminals; or (b) within a computer network." Just as Appellee 
agrees, this is a very broad definition. A broad definition that seems obvious it was intended 
to cover all unsolicited electronic messages, in whatever electronic form they are sent. As 
pointed out by Appellee, the legislature knows how to be specific and to narrow the scope 
of any statute. They apparently have done so with the recently enacted Spyware Control 
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Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-36-40, et seq. It seems more obvious that the legislature 
intentionally left the Utah Unsolicited Commercial Email Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-36-
101, et seq. broad so as to cover the types of electronic messages sent in this case as well. 
Appellees argue that pop ups and pop unders are not sent through email service 
providers, but rather through internet service providers. That argument is made without any 
citation to any fact established in the record. That is an unknown and, for the purposes of 
this matter, unverifiable allegation. That was one of the very purposes for the Appellant's 
prior motion for 56(f) relief. Plaintiff is not a computer or internet specialist, neither are his 
counsel. For that matter, Defendant is apparently a cruise line and there have been no 
supporting facts produced that either it or its counsel has expertise in the area. That simply 
has not been produced, but the information is necessary for the Court to make a proper 
decision. 
Appellee also argues that the weight of the legislative history falls in their favor. 
Appellee bases that argument upon the use of the term SPAM in the legislative debates 
before the House and the Senate. Appellee, however can cite to nowhere in the legislative 
record where SPAM is defined by the legislature. Citations to comments made by Senator 
Arent such as "[t]his bill concerns unsolicited commercial email, also known as SPAM" and 
that the intended purpose was to place "some reasonable limitations on SPAMers" and to 
provide a remedy for consumers, email service providers and businesses that bear the cost 
of receiving SPAM," do not define or even quantify the term. A pop up or pop under fits 
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under those statements as any other type of SPAM. Appellee apparently acknowledges that 
fact because instead of providing the Utah legislature's definition, it turns to case law and 
a web-based dictionary to support their argument. There is no question that pop ups and pop 
unders create cost for their recipients. Maybe even as much or more costs than an actual 
email. An email could potentially be ignored, but the recipient of a pop up or pop under 
must deal with it in someway before he or she can do anything else with their computer. In 
some ways the intrusion is worse with a pop up or pop under than an email. In all 
probability most internet users have either experienced first hand or heard of those infamous 
pornographic pop ups that pop up in a string or succession that cannot be closed fast enough 
and eventually require a whole system to be shut down before eliminating them from view. 
This is the protection the Utah legislature was seeking for Utah's citizens. It certainly is not 
an overly broad definition to include pop ups and pop unders within the meaning of an 
electronic communication. 
Appellee also cites to certain legislative record occurring after the statute had been 
passed, supposedly clarifying the meaning of the statute. That record should not even be 
considered. It relates to an amendment to the actual statute, an amendment that was not 
passed, but that might have eliminated this question altogether. That amendment reflects 
new and different opinions and efforts by Utah legislatures, not those opinions, efforts, or 
testimony relied upon for the statute that was actually passed. Although those statements 
appear to say what Appellees want them to say, they come in a time when they can not be 
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taken to limit or refine the meaning previously given, especially when they were made in 
relation to an amendment to the statute, that was not passed. They should not be considered. 
Appellee further argues that to adopt pop ups and pop unders within the meaning of 
the statute, would result in an absurd outcome. This suggestion is made because "pop-up" 
advertisements do not contain a subject line. Therefore, the argument goes, "how could the 
spammer comply with the Act that requires 'ADW to be included in the subject line, when 
a pop-up advertisement currently has no subject line?" This argument is flawed in at least 
two aspects. First, a spammer can add a subject line to any pop-up, just as they add text and 
other sophisticated graphics within the message. To comply, the spammer simply needs to 
add a subject line. It is disingenuous to choose the format of the pop-up, which format 
violates Utah law, and then argue that the pop-up is not covered because the format does not 
have a subject line. 
Second, the defendants fail to understand the intent of the statute. There is no 
prohibition in sending pop-up's that do not contain a subject line. Appellees can send pop-
up advertising to their clients as often as they like, even ad's that do not have the statutory 
requirements, because their client has a "relationship" with them. Spammers who send pop-
up's, if they chose not to include a subject line or to comply with other strictures of the act, 
are free to send pop-up's to those with whom they have existing or preexisting relationships. 
If they chose to send it to any others, they must comply with the Act. 
2. Appellant's Motion for Discovery under Rule 56(f) Should Have Been 
Granted. 
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Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
"Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just." 
The Utah Supreme Court has held on "numerous occasions that rule 56(f) motions 
opposing a summary judgment motion on the ground that discovery has not been completed 
should be granted liberally unless they are deemed dilatory or lacking in merit." Salt Lake 
County v. Western Dairymen Coop, 48 P.3d 910 (Utah 2002) (citing Price Dev. Co. v. Orem 
City, 995 P.2d 1237 (Utah 2000); CrosslandSav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1994); and 
Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984)). 
In this case, there were no interrogatories, no requests for admission, no requests for 
production, no depositions. There was simply no time to do them before Appellee filed it's 
motion to dismiss. As such, there cannot be any finding that Appellant's motion was 
dilatory. Nor could their motion be seen to be lacking in merit. Not a single person 
involved in the original litigation could be classified as an internet expert, except for the 
self-serving assertion of Defendant's affidavit supplying witness. There could be no way 
to dispute any of the facts, neither general about the process, Internet, or pop ups; nor the 
specific facts pertaining to the actual events. Not without discovery. Discovery would have 
allowed the parties to determine several material facts, including a determination of the 
method of sending pop-ups from one computer to another. This was set forth in Plaintiff s 
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rule 56(f) motion and memorandum. The lower court had enough basis to grant the 
continuance requested. It was error to deny it. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing arguments and law, Appellant respectfully requests this 
Court reverse the lower court's ruling that Pop-up advertisements are not governed under 
the Utah Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email Act, and further remand this 
matter back to the lower court to allow for appropriate discovery to occur. 
n DATED this I \ day of July, 2004. 
NELSOH,/SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN 
Denver CL Snmffer, Jr. 
Attorney ibrAppellant 
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